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~eflections on Police Bureaucracy in Modern Societies 
The emergence of a uniformed and organized police with a 
relative monopoly over the internal use of force in modern 
societies creates a number of problems for the society, princi- 
pally the political neutralization of the police, the mainten- 
ance of legality in their behavior toward the citizen, and the 
assurance that they will be universalistic in their discretion 
to apply the law. The organjzational means to deal with these 
I/ problems varies considerably among societies.- 
This paper makes no attempt to explain systematically how 
these differences in police organization came about. Quite 
clearly differences in civic culture among countries such as the 
degree of consensus institutionalized in the law, differences in 
the size and homogeneity of their populations, and even differ- 
ences in their national histories will explain variation in 
police organization.y This paper begins with these variations 
in police organization in mind, e.g., whether the police are 
accountable.primarily to a local government unit or to the 
State;.and tries to show how these differences in organization 
have.consequences for the behavior of citizens and the police 
in the society, and for other elements of police organization. 
A major organizational dimension of police systems is their 
accountability to political authority. In modern democratic 
societies a crucial feature of the accountability of police 
. organizations are the forms of political authority that protect 
the rights of citizens vis-a-vis the police organization. 
The .mass is,in a paradoxical situati.on in relation to 
governmental police systems. On the one hand they are vulner- 
able to state tyranny enforced through the police organization, 
i.e., a."police state".' On the other .hand they. are vulnerable 
to policy tyranny when ,State authority is unable to.directly, 
3/ control the police organization or hold it.accountab1e.- 
The organizational form of the accountability system in 
modern societies bears. an important. relationship to this.paradox. 
The vulnerability of the citizens to state tyranny has led in 
some societies to the development-of local government police 
organizational systems that are directly accountable .to local 
, authority. Local police systems are relatively inaccessible to 
centralized State control unles.stheir allegiance or compliance 
can be obtained by other means. These.organizationa1 safeguards 
against state -tyranny lead, however,"to greater vulnerability of 
the citizen to police tyranny since the State's right and 
opportunity to intervene is limited. 
There is an interesting-question whether the obverse cases 
obtain, e.g., is the citizen. 1ess.subject to local police tyranny 
in centrally.organized and controlled police systems? Such 
systems (at least in the more populous democratic societies) 
are large-scale bureaucracies. Bureaucratization, of course, - 
is a major way for governments to neutralize civic power. For 
the police, bureaucratization increases their legal reliability. 
The neutralization of civic power through bureaucracy while 
making the citizen less vulnerable to local police tyranny due 
to local interests opens the way to local bureaucratic tyranny, 
. . 
particularly 'where the central, bureaucracy cannot insure local 
accountability. To be sure,.the central features of bureau- 
cratic "tyranny" apply whether the bureaucracy,is local or 
State controlled. But in a police bureaucracy, one need only, 
assure .the allegiance of the central commanders to the political 
elites to insure reasonably effective control of the local 
organization. 
There are-a number of important consequences.that,follow 
from the form of' contr0.1 and accountability of police systems. 
Only-afew of those related to the gross distinction of whether 
they are centrally or locally-,organized and controlled are con- 
sidered below. 
In democratic societies, the police bear an important rela- 
tionship to the resolution of value conflicts in the society, 
particularly in situations where there is direct civic protest. 
As Silver has pointed out, the bureaucratically organized police 
systems emerged in democratic societies in the nineteenth century 
under conditions of mass protest and in the interest of the 
elite and state control of the mob.- 4' Indeed, he persuasively 
argues that to a degree the police functioned to deflect the 
hostility of the mass from the elites to the police. Under these 
conditions value protest often takes the form of protest against 
the police. The same conditions tend to hold in some societies 
with modern police systems. 
It would appear thak some of the important differences in 
the.form and consequences of protest are related to whether the 
police system is centrally or locally organized and controlled. 
When.there is civic protest on issues of values in the,society 
and the police are centrally organized and controlledithe State 
is.more .immediately involved as an organizational actor. The 
protest is more likely to be defined as an action against the 
State; -if sanctions are applied, -they tend to be .made across the 
system. On the other.hand, in societies where the police are 
more locally organized and controlled, such situations are more 
likely-.to be .defined as protests against local authority; then 
both sanctions and ac-tion taken as a donsequence of 1ocal.protest 
are defined as local rather than society-wide. Indeed, one might 
hypothesize that political revolutions and.revolutionary situa- 
tions are more likely to arise.in societies with central bureau- 
cratic police systems. Furthermore, it appears that where citizens 
are vulnerable to state tyranny, the state is more vulnerable to 
revolutionary protest. 
One of the major problems in holding the police accountable 
in all democratic societies is to insure their neutrality from 
local elites and interest groups. The criteria governing the 
legality of police-civil relations in a democratic society are 
" 
universalistic. A centralized bureaucracy probably is more effec- 
tive in insuring the legal neutrality of the police from local 
interests and elites than is a local one. 
Yet, this very neutralization of local interests in a 
centralized system can substantially affect their opportunity 
to change the police bureaucracy. The problems of civil rights 
and minority groups in the United States, may serve as a case in 
point. The organization of most policing on a local basis has 
meant that the American Negro minority has had less equity in 
the system, particularly in its Southern states. National 
control of the police undoubtedly would result in,a more 
equitable distribution of justice. At the same time, precisely 
because of patterns of local control, the Negro minority where 
effectively organized politically in American cities has changed 
the quality of police-civil relations and their organizations, 
changes that have benefited the white majority citizen as well 
as the Negro minority. 
Quite clearly, however, local organization of the police 
leads to greater variability among police organizations in the 
society, both in form and in practice, than does centralized 
control. Such variability seems conducive to innovation as well 
as differential application of universalistic norms. It perhaps 
is not surprising, therefore, that police organization in the 
United States shows both more innovation toward modern police 
systems and more variability in police-citizen relations than do 
more centralized systems. 
The organization of police on a local versus a centralized 
basis also is related to the nature of corruption of the police 
system when it occurs. In a local system, corruption is highly 
neutralized in the system on a locality basis because of its 
almost inevitable linkage to local government and its insulation 
from the State. Thus the State can neither corrupt or be 
corrupted by the police, The situation in a centralized system 
is quite different. While local bureaucratic corruption occurs, 
it becomes possible for the police to'be corrupted by the State, 
as well as vice versa. 
Two examples may serve by way 0.f illustration. In the 
United States where one has a primarily local system of polic- 
ing, one finds again and again instances of a "police scandal" 
involving local government officials and the police, or involv- 
ing local political elites and the police. One can easily be 
misled to conclude that corruption among the police and govern- 
ment officials is widespread in the United States. Yet, clearly 
that is far from the case. By the very-nature of the local 
organization of the police, the corruption of both the State 
political system and of the po1ice.i~ restricted. The,recent 
"Ben Barka" case in France illustrates the contrasting case. 
Where one'has a more centralized police system, the State may 
corrupt.,the police or, .alternatively, be.corrupted by it. 
The problems of police systems in deploying their manpower 
and other resources to accomplish their tasks likewise is related 
to the nature and form of thefr governmental control. The 
%ypical tactical problem arises-when.either the organization 
of the crime or'the mobility of the offenders extends beyond a 
territorial jurisdiction, This problem is common to all police 
systems. At the nation state level, it has led to the develop- 
ment.of-the Interpol organization among States. Within nations 
there are various organizational forms ranging from a national 
police through the extended.authority of.the London ,Metropolitan 
Police, or that of the more limited authority of specialiied 
1 
police organizations with jurisdiction ovek special forms of 
crime as in the,United States; Whenever,such special juGisdid- 
tional authority is limited, 'as it generally is in the United 
States, to federal crimes or specialized forms of crime, any 
organized criminal effort becomes difficult to control. There 
are two main reasons for this. The main visible forms of the 
operating organizations are local and become implicated in 
local police systems; the syndicated quality of the organization 
on an extra-territorial basis is largely an "invisible" corporate 
structure inaccessible to local police authority. 
There is another factor of the.structure of police systems 
that markedly affects police systems--the structure of their 
recruitment and promotion systems. The main difference lies in 
whether there is separate recruitment and promotion into the 
staff and command structure. Just two examples are given to 
show the effect this can have on the operating system. 
In the United States recruitment to the police is made al- 
most entirely at the lowest rank (patrolman) and promotion to the 
staff or command levels is made almost entirely from this level-- 
lateral insertion into the ranks is uncommon in the United States 
due to another local feature of the system, viz., tenure is 
limited to a loca1,civil service system and employee rights are 
nontransferrable across local police systems ./ These features 
of local police organization in the United States profoundly 
affect police occupational culture, prestige, and its internal 
organization of training. Though.it is not altogether a 
necessary consequence of these features, it does mean that the 
police elites are more.likely to qualify for staff or command 
positions on the basis of field experience than on the basis of 
qualifications prior to entry into the organization or as a 
-8- 
consequence of formal education within it. Though formally 
organized training =s not entirely lacking, it is largely 
locally organized and the educational staff is recruited from 
local talent./ These features of police organization then 
sharply limit the development of a profeksi&nal police and only 
the larger metropolitan or state police .organizations in the 
. . 
United States develop a profes'sional bad&. 
These features of recruitment and prombtion affect internal 
organization in yet other ways since they facilitate the develop- 
ment of primary group loyalties that extend from the top ranks 
of the organization to the bottom. The friends and work associ- 
ates of all previous ranks remain accessible to the commander. 
This very fact means that when corruption enters a police 
organization in the United States, it is not uncommon for it 
to involve men from the top to the bottom ranks. In a centralized 
police system with a separate officer corps, corruption, when it 
occurs, generally is less likely to spread from top to bottom. 
When it does, however, it is more likely to follow bureaucratic 
office than primary relations networks. 
The fact that police are locally organized and cpntrolled 
does not mean that they are necessarily highly integrated 
with or supported by the local populace. Much depends upon the 
general cultural support legitimating their activity and the 
patterns of deference obtaining in the society. The police in 
England and the United States provide an interesting contrast 
in this respect. The English police, other than the London 
Metropolitan Police, like those in the United States are 

police and legal control of them, there may be other reasons 
as well. Certainly in the absence of custom, a system of local 
control is subject to extra-local control in a democratic 
society largely through political means expressed in legislation 
or in constitutional authority exercised through the judicial 
decisions. In the United States, the relatively smaller role 
of customary relations affirming the legitimacy of police relations 
with citizens, and vice versa, creates problems of local versus 
central control as well. To achieve formal legal control through 
legislation at the national level in the pluralistic judicial 
system of the United States means establishing federal law. When 
such laws involve criminal violations, they come under the juris- 
diction of federal courts and are open to federal policing. 
Given the deep ambivalence toward federal control of policing in 
the United States, such legislative solutions are less likely to 
be used as a means of compliance. Judicial decision based largely 
on constitutional rather than legislated authority, therefore, 
has become a major means for controlling the legality of police- 
citizen relations in the United States. While the effect of 
these decisions is generally regarded as a limit on police dis- 
cretion under the law, they have largely related to discretion 
in means rather than ends of conduct--the legality of the 
behavior of the police toward the citizen. 
This discussion points to a central dilemma in democratic 
societies. On the one hand, they seek to organize the police so 
that public order is maintained and criminal deviance is con- 
trolled and sanctioned. On the other hand, they seek to safeguard 
citizen rights to dissent, to publically assemble, to privacy, 
and to dignity before the law. The organization of police field 
units then cannot be like that of the military where the command 
is structured to disseminate and execute orders that the line is 
to obey or to train the men in the line to cope with "new" 
situations with courage and honor. Much more is required of 
policemen in the line in modern democratic societies. The police 
officer in the line while he must know the rules, while he must 
be prepared to face situations with courage, and while he must do 
so with honor, must also,exercise ,considerable discretion -in making 
decisions. 
But the discretion involved is not merely one of training in 
the 1aw:or-knowing the,rules.. It requires a sensitivity,to.the 
citizen and his community, .to the organization of which he is:a 
part, and to the organized legal system of-which 1aw.enforcement 
is a part. Increasingly in democratic societies, particularly 
those with local police systems, the,civic, and legal pressures 
require a human relations bureaucracy with a professionalized 
police officer, though pluralistic democracies confront the prob- 
lem in a more exacerbated form. 
Yet this in-turn poses a problem for the bureaucratic organ- 
ization of the police as it does for any bureaucratic organization 
that encompasses professionals. The core of any client centered 
profession is a decision that affects the fate of the client. 
The professional must have the right to exercise considerable 
discretion in making that decision--to exercise professional 
judgment. Yet a bureaucracy generally is organized to limit 
employee judgment or discretion in applying the rules. Pro- 
fessionals require that decisions be decentralized and their 
discretion be overriding. Bureaucracies tend to centralize 
decisions and to subject decisions to higher review. This 
structure accounts for the dilemma of the professional in all 
bureaucratic organizations and does so for the professionaliza- 
tion of the police. Ultimately a professionalized police.in 
democratic societies.would require a quite different structure. 
What we have now in modern democratic societies is a profession- 
alized police organization rather than a professionalized 
8/ police .- 
The modern bureaucratic police department, like the modern 
military organization of which Janowitz writes, undergoes 
continuous transformation as a consequence of technological 
innovation, transforming the police department into a management 
9/ and technological engineering enterprise.- 
In the United States the more modern.(less tradition 
oriented) departments increasingly make use of the professional, 
managerial, and technical specialist who is not a member of the 
sworn personnel. In keeping with its military tradition, these 
are referred to as the "civilians" in the department. Not un- 
commonly these civilian management specialists are recruited 
from among the ranks of retired military management officers, 
and through the role transformation they are referred to as 
"civilians" in the department. Like the,military, the modern 
police department increasingly recruits or trains specialists 
that have their counterparts in other modern bureaucracies--the 
communications specialists, the computer specialists, .personnel 
specialists, management analysts, ,systems analysts, and a 
variety of others. The movement of these personnel in and out 
of police departments, much as in the military bureaucracy, 
decreases the influence of police tradition and the authority 
of the major police decision-makers. 
Unlike the military, however, most modern police departments 
in the, USA have more successfully,resisted the immediate inter- 
vention of the civilian policy makers and managers at the field 
operating level. On the other hand, the integration of the legal 
and law enforcement systems has meant that the judicial roles 
have had considerable indirect, if not direct, effect on the 
field operating systems. There is considerable variation among 
democratic societies, however, in the way the law enforcement 
and judicial subsystems are integrated. The Scandanavian countries, 
for instance, have a more immediate linkage than those evolving 
from the English common-law tradition. 
Historically in Western democratic societies, the emergence 
of a police system distinct from the militia and "voluntary 
service" in a watch system, led to the development of a tradition 
oriented rather than a rationally efficient bureaucratic system. 
Primary group loyalties, often based on a cohort effect of 
common movement through the ranks, and devotion to duty and honor 
bound the men in the organization together and brought the 
commanders close to the men in the line, particularly in those 
countries that did not recruit a distinct elite corps of staff 
and command. The rational bureaucratic departments sought to 
break these traditional loyalties and in part they disintegrated 
with technological innovation. Their disintegration, however, 
has created a new set of problems of how the command can insure 
control--how it could make its orders stick--with less reliance 
on traditional forms of allegiance to the command. 
A related dilemma arises at the staff and command level as 
well. One might almost paraphrase Janowitz's characterization 
lo/ of the dilemma for the military profession in this respect- 
since the dilemma is rapidly growing with the emergence of a highly 
centralized command that increasingly relies on communications 
and computer technology to make operating decisions. To do so, 
the professional police must recruit and retrain men for its elite 
who are skilled in police management. Yet at the same time it 
must recruit many officers who can command the allegiance of the 
men in the line. The problem is particularly acute in depart- 
ments that do not recruit solely into the line. While some men 
fulfill both role-set requirements, many do not. 
In rational bureaucratic organizations, symbolic appeals to 
courage, devotion to duty, and honor do not ring true. Yet they 
', 
are essential elements in a police system. The.modern trends in 
police departments make it difficult to perpetuate these e1.e- 
ments and the "new!' cohorts of-officers in the more modernized 
American police department display fewer of these-elements. 
Furthermore, an increasing emphasis on civic control of the 
police in the United States serves further to weaken them--one 
does a "professional" job, not his.duty. How far one can go in 
dispensing with these elements remains an open question. 
Potentially one should be able to go much further with the 
police than with the military, since, unlike the military, much 
more depends upon the necessity for and willingness.of a popu- 
lation to be policed, and their demand for police service. 
Theirs is not essentially a,conflict relationship ,with the 
police and the elements of heroic leadership necessary in combat 
perhaps can altogether disappear for the police. 
The fact that no bureaucracy conforms to a model of rational 
organization is well established. While the modernizing police 
department places heavy organizational emphasis on modern techni- 
ques of personnel selection and training, on technology and 
technical efficiency, and on rational planning and management, 
it cannot dispense with charisma in its leaders and a commitment 
to duty and honor, particularly in democratic societies, like 
the United States that are fundamentally inhospitable to the 
1 I/ police .- 
A paramilitary organization like the police displays, and 
perhaps must continue to display, elements of traditional and 
rational bureaucracies. In modern democratic societies they 
must also be human relations centered bureaucracies. 
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